Paper for
Jornadas del Discurso Político, UPF, Barcelona
Second
draft, April 29, 2001.
POLITICAL DISCOURSE AND IDEOLOGY
Teun A. van Dijk
University
of Amsterdam
Universitat
Pompeu Fabra, Barcelona
Introduction
Probably more than
any other kind of discourse, political discourse is eminently ideological. In
this paper we examine some general properties of ideologies as forms of social
cognition and their relations to political text and talk.
The very formulation
of this goal implies that my approach needs to be multidisciplinary: We are
dealing (a) with political cognition, (b) with discourse structures and of
course (c) with the socio-political context in which such cognitions and
discourses have their meanings and functions. This framework is very complex,
and this paper can only address some of its issues.
Thus, in earlier work
we have examined the general nature of ideologies, the ways these may be
expressed in discourse, generally, on the one hand (Van Dijk, 1998a), and with
political discourse, on the other hand (Van Dijk, 1998b, 2000; Wodak & Van
Dijk, 2000).
This paper tries to
combine these different strands of research, by asking ourselves whether
specific discourse genres or domains, such as those of politics, have specific
ways of 'formulating ideology'. Indeed, is the expression of ideology in
various forms of political discourse very different from the expression of
ideology in educational, academic, corporate or legal discourse, for instance?
We define ideologies
as the basis of the social representations of groups (Van Dijk, 1998), where
the notion of social representation is broader than that used by Moscovici and
his followers (see e.g., Farr & Moscovici, 1984), namely any kind of
socially shared mental representation.
This means that if we
focus on politicians, we shall usually have at least two ideologies as
expressed in their text and talk: First professional ideologies that underly
their functioning as politicians. And second, the socio-political ideologies
they adhere to, e.g., as members of political parties or social groups. We thus
have conservative and progressive politicians, socialists and neoliberals,
Christian-democrats, greens, nationalists and racists, and so on. And it is
likely that these ideologies will show up and combine in the discourse of
politicians.
This interaction
between several ideologies in the discourse of politicians is not simply
accumulative, however. It may be the case, for instance, that the basic
principles of professional ideologies sometimes clash with those of the social
ideologies politicians represent. Thus, one may profess to democratic
principles because that is what the dominant consensus requires, but socially
one may represent ideologies based on principles of inequality, as is the case
for racist ideologies. Or, if politicians represent religious parties, their
allegiance to God may often conflict with their allegiance to democratic
ideologies. In other words, ideology, discourse and politics form a triangle
that poses interesting theoretical and analytical questions.
Ideology
I shall be brief
about ideology, and refer to my other work for more extensive treatments (Van
Dijk, 1998a). I just list the major tenets of my approach:
a. Among many other things, ideologies are systems of beliefs.
b. These systems of
beliefs are shared by members of a social group.
c. Groups also share
other beliefs, such as knowledge and attitudes.
d. The beliefs shared
by a group will be called 'social representations' (SRs).
e. Ideologies are the
organizing, 'basic' beliefs of these SRs.
f. Groups not only
have their 'own', ideologically based, "knowledge" (often called
"beliefs" by other groups), but also share in more general,
consensual, culturally shared knowledge, which may be called (cultural) 'common
ground'.
g. This cultural
common ground may be seen as the foundation of all cognition, across and
between different groups, and thus is also presupposed by different ideologies.
h. Common ground may
be empirically assessed as all beliefs that are presupposed in public
discourse. This means that, for a given culture, such common ground is
non-controversial, commonsensical, and hence non-ideological.
i. Part of the common
ground are also the general norms and values shared by the members of a
culture.
j. Groups select some
of these cultural values and organize them in their own ideologies, e.g.,
freedom, equality, justice or objectivity.
k. Ideologies
probably have a canonical structure that facilities their acquisition, use and
change.
m. Although we don't
know yet what this structure might be, it is probably related to the basic
social properties of a group, such as the criteria of group membership,
activities, aims, norms and values, relations to other groups, and specific
group resources (or lack thereof) -- or 'capital'.
n. Ideologies and
their structures may also be seen as the cognitive core of the identity of a
group and its members, that is, as a social self-schema of a group.
o. Ideologies and the
social representations organized by them control the social practices of actors
as group members.
This
summary of my concept of ideology stresses its relations to other forms of
socially shared mental representations, such as specific group knowledge and
cultural common ground. My formulation implies a specific architecture of
social cognition, in such a way that differential group beliefs presuppose more
general, cultural beliefs. Thus feminist ideologies as well as male chauvinist
ones both presuppose that group members know what men and women (and much more)
are. The same is true for discourse, which also presupposes this common ground,
so that people, even between groups, can understand each other, and cooperate.
In the same way that such common ground serves as the basis for group cognitions,
the latter are in turn based on the fundamental beliefs, the ideology, of a
group. For instance, socially shared opinions about immigration may be based on
racist or antiracist ideologies. Note incidentally that the notion of 'common
ground' used here is broad and cultural, and not interpersonal, as defined for
successful conversation by Herbert Clark in his work on common ground (Clark,
1996).
Social
representations such as group beliefs, attitudes and ideologies are by
definition general and fairly abstract: They need to be used by group members
in different situations. They are, for instance, about what WE think about
THEM, in general, and not what you and I now think about some specific person.
Sometimes, such general beliefs are directly expressed in discourse, for
instance as generic expressions in didactic discourse and propaganda -- which
typicall have the function to explain to young people or potential new members,
what OUR general beliefs are about an issue. Sometimes such general beliefs
also are expressed as legitimating premises in arguments, for instance to argue
a more specific point: In order to argue that Mary should have the same salary
as John, we may express the general, social opinion that men and women should
be paid the same salary for the same work.
Between ideology and
discourse: mental models
Ideologies and other
social representations control discourse and other social practices of group
members. They are able to do that only when their natural and abstract
properties also apply in specific situations, to specific actors, actions and
events. That is, besides the social psychology of group beliefs, we also need
an individual psychology of personal beliefs and experiences, namely those of
individual social actors and speakers. Political discourse may express group
ideologies and other beliefs, especially in collective forms of text and talk
such as party programs. But many forms of political discourse are produced by
individual speakers, and the ways they 'personalize' the group beliefs underly
the more particular properties of political discourse. That is, between social
beliefs and discourse we need a cognitive interface that represents personal
beliefs, opinions or experiences.
Fortunately, current
cognitive psychology has a powerful theoretical notion to account precisely for
this interface: mental models (Johnson-Laird, 1983; Van Dijk & Kintsch,
1983; Van Oostendorp & Goldman, 1999). These models are personal
representations (in what is called 'episodic memory') of specific events people
witness, participate in, or hear/read about. Such representations not only
feature personal knowledge about such an event, but also opinions. That is,
they are at the same time personal interpretations and evaluations of an event,
and thus represent what we usually call 'experiences'. Much of the content of
these models derives from 'applied' general, social beliefs, including
ideologies. That is, our personal models may be (socially) biased, as when a
politician has a conservative interpretation of a political event.
When we speak, write
or read about such an event, we use our mental models as the cognitive basis of
the discourse production or comprehension process. This is why mental models
were called an 'interface' between social beliefs and discourse. This means,
for instance, that in the production of the semantic representation of a
discourse, a speaker includes (contextually relevant -- see below) propositions
from her or his mental model. And the structure of this model may in turn also influence
the structure of the discourse: High level propositions may be selected as
macropropositions (topics) of the text, and the same is true for the Setting
(Time, Location), Participants and their attributes, Actions, etc. that define
the model.
Context models
There is still one
piece of theory missing before we can apply this framework to political
discourse. Speech participants not only have mental models of events they talk
about (and that are the basis of the meaning of their discourse), but also mental
models of the event in which they participate as speakers and recipients. That
is, they also have a personal (subjective, possibly ideologically biased)
representation of the communicative situation. This representation will be
called a context model, or simply a context. That is, contexts are not 'out
there', in 'reality', but personal mental constructs and interpretations of a
communicative event. They may hence be partly different for different
participants, which often gives rise to communicative conflicts (Van Dijk,
1999).
Context models
exercise the ongoing control of discourse production and understanding. They
define what speech acts are being performed, what aims, goals and functions a
discourse has, what knowledge and other beliefs the participants have (also
about the others' beliefs), and in general how the structures of discourse are
adapted to the social situation. Context models define what (for a language
user) is the whole of the relevant information of a communicative event. That is,
The theory of context models provides a (cognitive) theory of relevance (for a
related but different approach, see Sperber & Wilson, 1986).
Context models are
like models of other events, but with specific categories tuned to
communicative events, such as the overall social domain (e.g., politics,
education), the overall social action being accomplished (e.g., legislation,
teaching), setting (time, location), participant roles (communicative,
relational or social roles), and cognitions (beliefs, goals, aims, opinions).
Their control of discourse operates at all levels: They tell the language users
which relevant (interesting, new, etc.) propositions to select in event models,
what speech act to realize and what the conditions of the speech act are, what politeness
forms to choose, what style characteristics to select, and so on until the very
intonation of spoken discourse.
Like other mental
models, also context models may be ideologically biased. That is, when speakers
of different political parties speak with each other, then they not only have
ideologically based mental models of the events (e.g., some recent immigration
event) talked about, but also about each other, or even about the current
setting, aims, or ongoing interaction. Thus, one speaker may find the other a
racist, an opinion that in turn may be based on an anti-racist ideology. It
goes without saying that such ideologically biased context models influence
discourse in many ways. For instance, they may cause speakers to select a less
polite style than would be appropriate in this situation. Indeed, sexism or
racism may also be implemented in the sexist or racist ways people speak to
members of other groups.
It needs little
argument that the same may be true in political argument, and that thus
political ideologies may influence political discourse not only at the level of
'content' but also at the various levels of 'form' and 'interaction', as we
shall see below.
Political discourse
Defining 'political
discourse'
The first observation
that needs to be made about political discourse is that it is not a genre, but
a class of genres defined by a social domain, namely that of politics (Van
Dijk, 1998b). In the same way, scientific discourse, educational discourse and
legal discourse represent the classes of discourse genres of the domains of
science, education and law, respectively. Thus, government deliberations,
parliamentary debates, party programs, and speeches by politicians, are among
the many genres that belong to the domain of politics. It can't be the task of
this paper to precisely define that domain, which --like other social domains--
has of course fuzzy boundaries. Political science offers as many definitions of
'politics' as there are political scientists, ranging from very general characterizations
of politics in terms of power or collective decision making, to the much more
specific definition of politics as the set of activities politicians engage in.
In this paper, I
prefer to start from this latter, more narrowly circumscribed characterization
of politics, and shall for simplicity's sake assume that political discourse is
the discourse of politicians. This rules out, for the moment, even those
discourse genres at the boundaries of the domain of politics with other
domains, such as the discourse of a student demonstration, the messages of an
anti-abortion campaign, corporate talk intended to influence tax or investment
legislation, or an everyday conversation about politics. That is, these
discourses belong to other social domains, even if their intention may be to
influence political decision making. Conversely, a bill about education
policies is a genre of political discourse, even if it has or intends to have
influence in the domain of education.
Having thus limited
the range of political discourse to the 'professional' realm of the activities
of politicians, the next observation is that such discourse is by the same
token a form of institutional discourse. That is, only those discourses of
politicians are considered that are produced in institutional settings, such as
governments, parliaments or political parties. This means that an informal
conversation of a politician with her friends does not count as a political
discourse: the discourse must be produced by the speaker in her professional
role of a politician and in an institutional setting. In a more action-oriented
way, we may also say that discourse is political when it accomplishes a
political act in a political institution, such as governing, legislation,
electoral campaigning, and so on (for institutional discourse, see e.g., Drew
& Wootton, 1989; Drew & Heritage, 1992; Sarangi & Roberts, 1999).
Describing political
discourse
Once confined
political discourse to the institutionally bound text and talk of politicians,
our next task is to systematically describe the genres that belong to that
domain. This is not a straightforward enterprise, comparable to the
construction of any other genre. Take debates in parliaments, for instance.
What specific and unique discursive properties define such debates (Van Dijk,
2000; for introduction to the properties of discourse in general, see van Dijk,
1997 )?
Their topic?
Unlikely, because parliamentary debates may be about virtually any topic in
society that politicians deem interesting and relevant to talk about. Perhaps
the only (fuzzy) restriction one may come up with is that the topics are
usually about events in the public sphere, in particular those events that
require collective decision making, policies, regulation or legislation.
Their style, perhaps,
such as their lexical choice? Hardly, although there is often a general
formality constraint, as for any other kind of institutional discourse. There
are very few words that are only used by politicians, although there may be
some jargon politicians share with the bureaucracies (ministries, government
agencies, etc.). Also, there are a few ritual formulas for addressing or
speaking about other MPs, or addressing the chair, but of course these cannot
alone define the genre.
The overall form or
format of the debate? It would be surprising if politicians would follow their
own interactional and argumentational categories and rules. Thus, a
parliamentary debate is not very different from any other debate, for instance
in the annual stockholders meetings of big corporations. As in some other
institutional or organizational meetings, there is a strict time schedule and
turn allocation by the Chair.
A contextual
description
We must conclude that
although there are perhaps a few topical, stylistic and interactional
constraints that are fairly typical of parliamentary debates, we do not find
obvious evidence that the typology of political discourse is based on
('verbal') properties of text or talk. The same is probably true for government
meetings, party programs or election campaigns, which are most likely very
similar to any other executive meeting, program or campaign.
If we then recall
that the definition of the (class of) political discourse genres was defined in
terms of professional politicians and political institutions, we may conclude
that the genre description of political discourse should not so much take place
at the levels of text, but rather at the level of context. That is, to begin
with, a parliamentary debate is primarily (and nearly trivially) defined by the
fact that the participants are MPs, and that it takes place in the institution
of (a) parliament. Secondly, it is political act of legislation or
policy-making, among others, that is accomplished by such a debate. Thirdly,
the consequences of the debate are defined in the specific institutional terms
of political decision making: laws are enacted, policies decided, elections
held, and so on. These and many other characteristics of political discourse
obviously are defined in terms of contextual --and not 'textual' --categories,
such as:
(a) The global
domain: politics
(b) The global act(s)
being implemented: legislation, policy making, etc.
(c) The global
setting (House of parliament, session of parliament, etc.)
(d) The local
political acts being accomplished: Tabling a motion, 'doing' opposition, etc.
(e) The political
roles of the participants: MP, representative, party member, member of the
opposition, etc.
(f) The political
cognitions of the participants: Political beliefs and ideologies; aims and
objectives, etc.
These (and some
other) categories form a schema that defines the structure of the communicative
events represented by participants in their context models, as defined above.
In other words, the 'political' nature of debates, speeches, meetings,
campaigns, advertising, etc. is defined in terms of their context
characteristics, and not primarily by structural properties of the text itself.
Of course, although
the distinguishing properties of political discourse may be largely contextual,
this does not mean that we should no longer study the structures of political
discourse: A study of the topics, topoi, coherence, arguments, lexical style,
disclaimers and many rhetorical features (metaphors, euphemisms, hyperbolas,
etc) of a political discourse may of course reveal much about the unique
character of such a discourse, and also allows inferences about the cognitive,
social and especially political functions of such discourse (among the many
studies of political discourse, see, e.g., Atkinson, 1984; Blommaert &
Bulcaen, 1998; Chilton, 1985, 1988, 1995; Geis, 1987; Wodak & Menz, 1990;
Wodak & Van Dijk, 2000).
Politics and ideology
We already suggested
that if there is one domain of society where ideologies are rife it is of
course politics. Indeed, the commonsense meaning of ideology often simply
identifies ideologies as political ideologies: socialism, communism,
(neo-)liberalism, and more recently green politics. Our definition of ideology
is more general, so it may be expected that apart from such political
ideologies also other ideologies may be expressed in political discourse, such
as ecological, feminist or racist ones. Since ideologies are defined in terms
of basic beliefs shared by the members of groups, this also means that
political discourse is the site where politicians' multiple ideological
identities are enacted: By definition they speak as politicians, but also as
conservatives or liberals, men or women, feminists or anti-feminists, racists
or anti-racists, and so on.
Indeed, one of the
reasons why contemporary political science has often shown reluctance to accept
the very notion of ideology is the fact that in actual discourse or social
practices, social actors may have unique combinations of ideologies. That is,
an MP may be at the same time economically a neo-liberal, radically progressive
in social issues such as abortion or minority rights, but at the same time a
staunch nationalist. Or more specifically, she may be a feminist but oppose liberal
abortion policies, and so on.
Such personally
unique combinations of ideologies, also in politics, are not at all
inconsistent with a general theory of ideology, in the same way as people's
idiosyncratic talk is not a counter-example against the existence of languages
or grammars. Ideologies are defined for groups, and not for individuals. And of
course, based on their personal experiences and life situations, and diverse
group memberships, individuals may share in (sometimes 'incompatible') ideologies.
Political and ideological discourse analysis is usually based on individual
discourses, so it will not be strange at all to find influences of various
ideologies. In the same way as discourses may exhibit intertextuality, they
also may show 'interideologicality'. Indeed, one of the interesting challenges
of ideological analyses of political discourse is not only to identify these
various ideological sources, but also the unique way they interact in the
production of specific discourses.
Before we move to the
more specific question of ideological analysis of political discourse, we
briefly need to attend to two further theoretical issues. Among the various
types of ideologies that may be distinguished, professional group ideologies
play an important role in everyday life, because they control much of our daily
institutional or organizational activities, e.g., as professors, journalists,
dentists or judges (Geison, 1983). The same may thus be true of politicians, so
that the social identity of politicians will also be defined by such categories
as membership devices, activities, aims and goals, norms and values, relations
to other groups and resources or 'capital'. We may expect that politicians
exhibiting their identity will tacitly or explicitly attend to such categories,
also in discourse. Thus, the (ideological!) self-identity of politicians as
professionals may be (roughly) defined as follows:
a. Identity
criterion: Election to political office
b. Activities:
'Doing' politics (represent citizens, legislate, etc)
c. Aim: Govern
country, state or city, etc.
d. Norms, values:
Democratic values, honesty, etc.
e. Position, relation
to other groups: Relation with constituents, etc.
f. Resource:
Political power.
Obviously, we need
empirical (discourse) data to fill in the detailed ideological contents of
these categories, that is, analyses of political discourses in which
politicians make reference to themselves and other politicians. Thus, if
politicians regularly criticize other politicians for 'not listening to the
voice of the people', as is often the case in populist political discourse,
then we may assume that the basic activities and norms defining the ideology of
politicians involves 'listening to the voice of the people'.
The second question
that needs brief comment, and that has been referred to above, is whether it
makes sense to speak of 'political ideologies', as a specific sub-type -- and
different from the professional ideologies of politicians, which in principle
apply to all of them, whether they are on the left or on the right. If there
are political ideologies, then they must specifically apply in the domain of
politics, and organize political attitudes and political practices.
The best-known
candidates for this kind of ideological role are the broad system ideologies,
such as those of socialism and liberalism. However, these do not apply
specifically to politics, but organize attitudes about a host of social issues,
also outside of politics, such as the labor market, corporate activities, and
so on. The same is a fortiori true for typical social ideologies such as
feminism, and (anti)racism, as well as for religious ideologies such as
Christendom and Islam.
Perhaps closest to
being specifically political, are those ideologies that specifically pertain to
the organization of the state, such as democracy, oligarchy, and so on, of
which democracy is consensually the currently dominant ideology. So much so,
that many of its tenets probably coincide with politicians' ideological
self-definition as being 'democratic'. The dominant value characterizing this
ideology would be 'equality', and the main resource the power of the people.
Indeed, democracy is (ideologically speaking -- which does not mean that it is
so in real life!) so much dominant and consensual in politics, that it is
hardly experienced as an ideology anymore, but as a general, undisputed value
that is part of what we have called the cultural common ground. Indeed, lacking
democracy is typically associated with other times, and "other"
cultures. Relevant for us is that in the ideological analysis of political
discourse, we are bound to find, perhaps largely implicitly, the contents of
the ideology of democracy -- and more specifically, manifestations of the
opinions that are part of the attitudes organized by this ideology, such as
those about 'free elections', accountability to the voters, and so on.
Ideological analysis
of political discourse
Against the
background of the complex theoretical framework briefly summarized above, we are
now able to focus on the ideological analysis of political discourse. The
assumption has been that political discourse and its properties are controlled
by one or more underlying ideologies, possibly through more specific (but still
general) social attitudes, on the one hand, and more personal mental models of
concrete events, and finally by context models of the communicative situation,
on the other hand. So, we'll be interested in examining the following aspects
of political discourse:
(a) The dimensions,
levels, structures, strategies or moves in which ideologically based beliefs
exhibit themselves in discourse.
(b) Discursive
evidence of the interplay of several ideologies.
We shall conduct this
investigation by analyzing a concrete text, namely a debate on asylum seekers
in the British House of Commons (March, 5 1997, as published in Hansard).
Ideological
structures in a parliamentary debate
Parliamentary debates
constitute one of the most prominent genres of the domain of politics (for
details, see Wodak & Van Dijk, 2000). Their prominence derives not so much
from the fact that in democracies the 'power of the people' is being exercised
by parliament, and that parliamentary debates thus --ideally-- constitute the
most powerful type of discourse of the state. Rather, parliamentary debates are
the site where the various ideological forces in society, in the form of the
political parties that represent them, are confronting each other in the public
sphere. Parliamentary debates are not only public, but also for the record, so
that anything participants say is open for public inspection (usually through
the mass media): Everything MPs say may indeed be used against them.
For our purposes, as
suggested, parliamentary debates are especially interesting because they
exhibit, by definition, the social cognitions of political parties and their
members. We already argued that it is not so much the text of these debates as
rather various aspects of their context that define such debates as a genre:
Who is speaking and what political acts being accomplished by such speech
inherently defines what legislation is. Part of that context are the relevant
social cognitions of the participants. Indeed, party membership, and whether or
not one supports or opposes the current government, is first of all a question
of socially shared opinions. And debate in parliament is thus the embodiment of
a clash of opposed opinions.
Ideological analysis
in its most straightforward guise involves detecting in text and talk the expression
of such ideologically based opinions. We already have shown that, somewhat less
trivially, the relation between ideology and discourse may be quite indirect.
Specific attitudes (say about immigration), and personal models (personal
beliefs about a recent event), may be the kind of representations that are the
interface between ideologies and discourse structures. This means that
ideologies are not always very explicit. They may be disguised, hidden or
implicit. They may come in the form of opinions about specific events, or in
the way such an event is described, more or less prominently.
Let us now examine
some of the ideological properties of the debate we have selected as our
example. Note though that many of the properties of the debate are ignored
here, because they are not an expression of underlying ideologies of MPs.
Note that Mrs. Gorman
is a supporter of the Conservative government in power, and that her attack is
directed against a Labour opposition aiming at making current legislation about
the reception of reception less harsh.
The debate is opened
by --and the initiative of-- Mrs. Teresa Gorman, Conservative MP for Billrecay.
Mrs. Gorman is a supporter of the Conservative government in power, and that
her attack is directed against a Labour opposition aiming at making current
legislation about the reception of reception less harsh.
In her speech, which
is briefly interrupted by two other conservatives, and then replied to by
Labour immigration specialist Corbyn, Mrs. Gorman specifically focuses on the
financial consequences of what she defines as "bogus" asylum seekers.
Little analysis is necessary to conclude that Mrs. Gorman is indeed
conservative, tough on immigration, and racist. That is, her speech is imbued
with many expressions of these ideologies. It is our special task here not only
to identify these traces of the ideologies she identifies with, but especially
also to examine how such ideologies are actually formulated (or left implicit)
in parliamentary debates.
Mrs. Gorman begins
her speech as follows,
(1) Mrs. Teresa
Gorman (Billericay): I want to bring to the attention of the
House the particular difficulties faced by the London boroughs because of the
problems of asylum seekers.
Before we
say something about underlying ideologies, note that part of this first
fragment is not so much directly about asylum seekers, as rather about Mrs.
Gorman and the House, that is, on properties of the context. In other words,
the speech begins with some deictic expressions that need to be interpreted in
terms of the contexts (or rather: context models) as ongoingly constructed by
herself and other MP. And when she speaks about the difficulties of the London
boroughs, this is not merely a summarizing reference to the topic of her
speech, but also implicitly an expression of her role as MP: to represent the
people (in this case London boroughs) and their problems -- even when these are
not her constituents, as is the case here. She thereby conveys the impression
that she is doing her job, and cares for the people -- an important part of a
democratic conception of the task of representatives. Note that, at the deepest
level of these context models (Mrs Gorman being a democratic MP defending the
people) we do have the ideology of democracy. This and other ideologies and
attitudes will coordinate the social representations of all participants.
As to the
"content" of this fragment, Mrs. Gorman not only speaks about the
difficulties of the London Boroughs, but also of the "problems of asylum
seekers". This ambiguous expression may refer to the problems of asylum seekers, or to the problems caused by asylum seekers. The
ambiguity and hence vagueness may be a device of positive self-presentation,
which requires that anything negative said about Others be formulated in an
indirect, vague or mitigated way. The rest of her speech, however, does not
leave any doubt about the interpretation that attributes the problems to (be
caused by) the refugees.
Defining refugees as
a problem is classic topos of anti-immigrant discourse -- and probably a
dominant category in a socially shared anti-foreigner attitude, which in turn
is based on a racist ideology. Most of the cognitive representations derived
from such an ideology describe Us in positive terms, and Them in negative
terms. One way of doing this is to represent the Others in terms of a Problem-for-Us at all social levels: jobs, housing, welfare, crime, attitudes, and so on.
The same polarization
may also be implemented and expressed in a stronger form: They are a Threat-for-Us.
Thus, we see how underlying belief structures are implemented at the semantic
level of the text by the choice of a specific lexical item. The ideological
significance of such lexicalization comes to the fore when we substitute it by
possible other items expressing a similar situation: The situation of the
reception refugees may also be defined as a challenge, and as a cultural,
financial and laboral bonus for the country: After all, many refugees are
highly educated and very motivated, and will probably contribute a lot to their
new homeland.
Note finally a
question of form: Defining refugees as a Problem -- as people who cause
(our)difficulties -- is being done right from the beginning. In other words,
there is an order effect here -- in which initial definitions have an important
impact on the understanding of the rest of the speech. Indeed, since the notion
is part of the thematic first sentence, it would be part of the
macroproposition controlling this speech -- as it does in the mental model Mrs.
Gorman has about the immigration of refugees and the consequences for some
London boroughs.
In sum, in this
example we witness the expression of an underlying ideology in terms of a
negative definition of a situation as a 'problem', and an (still implicit)
attribution of such problems to refugees.
Mrs. Gorman is not
very vague for a long time. Already the next paragraph of her speech opens the
usual registers of xenophobic talk, though still in a subdued tone:
(2) There
are, of course, asylum seekers and asylum seekers. I entirely support the
policy of the Government to help genuine asylum seekers, but to discourage the
growing number of people from abroad who come to Britain on holiday, as
students or in some other capacity and, when the time comes for them to leave,
declare themselves to be in need of asylum.
The second
move in Mrs. Gorman's speech is one of categorization, namely a
distinction between genuine (good) and non-genuine (bad) asylum seekers.
Although later in her speech she sometimes pays lip service to this
distinction, very often she generalizes about all refugees. Categorization is
one of the elementary mental aspects of actor and group description, as we know
from many studies in social psychology (see, e.g., Abrams & Hogg, 1999;
Fiske & Taylor, 1991).
In order for positive
self-presentation and negative other-presentation to work, however, Mrs. Gorman
cannot possibly ignore, in the current parliamentary context, that not all
refugees are bad. This first categorization is thus an important move of
positive self-presentation, namely a disclaimer of Apparent Concession: There
are also "good" ones among them (for these disclaimers, see e.g., Van
Dijk, 1984, 1987, 1993). The implication of this disclaimer is to emphasize
that she cannot possible a racist, because she supports help for
"real" refugees. Of course, after this quick disclaimer, she can then
focus on the Others -- namely the "bad" immigrants.
Note that this whole
passage is articulated by underlying norms, values and ideologies that sustain
the polarization between genuine and non-genuine asylum seekers. There is not
merely a rhetorically expressed categorization (using a repetitive standard
phrase --usually pronounced with mounting intonation: there are X and X!), but
also hyperbolic ("entirely") reference to support for the
government's help. Similarly, instead of bluntly describing the non-genuine
ones as "bogus" as she does later in her speech, she here refers to
the others as people from abroad who overstay, ironically adding "declare
themselves to be in need of asylum" -- a reference to a declarative verb
that implies that the others only say they need asylum, but do not
really need it. Note that even the lexical item "discourage" may be
interpreted as a euphemism for the harsh immigration policies of the
Conservative government -- and hence as form of avoiding a negative
self-description.
In terms of the point
of our analysis, we see that this passage indirectly expresses a xenophobic
ideology by sub-categorizing refugees into good and bad ones, and at the same
time "softens" the possibly negative impact of such a categorization
by emphasizing the expression of a humanistic ideology of help to people who
need it (limited of course to the few who are declared "genuine").
The actual description of what happens is like a scriptal model of what happens
when non-genuine asylum seekers want to enter the country. The last sentence of
this fragment thus becomes a mini-story expressing this model, following the
well-known categories of everyday storytelling: Orientation ('they were just
innocent holiday makers...') followed by the unexpected Complication ('...but
suddenly they declare themselves..."). Although framed in more general
terms (no specific persons are mentioned), such a model-based mini-story makes
her general point much more concrete, and therefore persuasive.
Finally, this small
passage can (trivially) be interpreted in light of a professional ideology --
namely that of the MP correctly doing her job. In the previous passage, she
declares herself to worry about London boroughs, and in this passage she shows
that she is a staunch defender of her own (Conservative) government. That is,
she implements and sustains the ideologically based policy of her party, and thus
behaves like an MP should do. In others words, we see that nearly at all levels
of this small fragment, several ideologies appear in various structures.
The political upshot and function of the expression of these ideologies here is first of all
clearly expressed in terms of Mrs. Gorman's explicit support for her
government's policy, by associating this policy with a positive concern for
genuine asylum-seekers, on the one hand, but to distance herself and her party,
from non-genuine asylum-seekers. In this way, as will also be abundantly clear
in the rest of her talk, she at the same time plays a strategic populist card,
by preformulating the usual public rejection of "bogus"
asylum-seekers.
It is important to
emphasize the political specificity not only of the underlying ideologies
(Conservative vs. Labour) but also that the way these are actually expressed,
implemented or enacted always has political conditions, consequences of
implications. Ideologies are only brought to bear in parliamentary debates when
they are contextually -- and hence politically -- relevant. Mrs. Gorman may not
feel or share any concern for genuine refugees at all, but it is important for
political reasons that the Conservative party not be directly associated with
xenophobic exclusion policies.
Similarly, political
discourse and hence political action (such as supporting the government,
attacking the opposition, representing voters and making populist claims) may
derive part of their coherence, and hence their credibility and legitimacy when
based on consistent ideological principles.
On the other hand,
politics nearly always has priority over ideology. Thus, when the left in both
the UK and France came to power -- after criticizing the immigration policies
of the previous, conservative governments -- they hardly changed the draconian
immigration laws, well aware that large numbers of their voters would not
welcome a too soft policy on immigration. In other words, in political
situations many politicians, especially of government parties, will rather look
at their popularity with the voters than in their ideological heart of hearts.
This is also one of
the reasons why the rest of Mrs. Gorman's talk is increasingly blatant about
the category of "non-genuine" refugees, whom already in the next
paragraph she not only describes as "economic refugees" but also
labels as "benefit seekers on holidays". The style of these last
words not only is a form of the familiar negative other description of
xenophobic discourse, but also has a clear populist function: It is thus how
her voters like to think and speak about refugees. This political orientation
to the "ratepayers" becomes even clearer in the following passage:
(3) It is
wrong that ratepayers in the London area should bear an undue proportion of the
burden of expenditure that those people are causing.
The use of
"wrong" presupposes a norm, and such a norm is implemented in the
ideologically based political attitudes ratepayers are attributed by Mrs.
Gordon in this blatant populist move. It may indeed be doubted whether a
conservative and racist MP like Mrs. Gorman cares very much for the taxes her
"ratepayers" have to pay. But again, her professional ideology
prescribes concern for the voters, a conservative ideology professes less state
intervention and less taxes, and her anti-foreigner ideology inspires the
selection of precisely the refugees as a cause for financial concern.
It is not likely, for
instance, that she will explain that virtually all the expenditures
"caused" by the refugee are being paid to British welfare
professionals and companies -- and hardly to the refugees themselves, and even
then will eventually benefit British businesses, and that the taxpayer thus
finances British professionals and businesses rather than asylum seekers.
This last remark is
not only meant as a critique of Mrs. Gorman's speech, but also as an analytical
remark about the kind of information that is not included in a speech,
also for ideological reasons. In other words, also omissions are often
ideologically based, and they can only analytically be recuperated if one knows
about the details of immigration -- knowledge that few members of the public at
large have, so that such incomplete and therefore misleading discourses meet
very little critique, not even in the mass media.
Consider also the
following fragments, in which Mrs. Gorman begins with a well-known disclaimer
of Apparent Empathy (I understand..but) expressing the underlying humanistic
ideology, but ends, in the next passage, by describing the refugees in terms of
"bogus":
(4) I
understand that many people want to come to Britain to work, but there is a
procedure whereby people can legitimately become part of our community. People
who come as economic migrants are sidestepping that.
(5) The Government,
with cross-party backing, decided to do something about the matter. The Asylum
and Immigration Act 1996 stated that people whose application to remain in
Britain had been turned down could no longer receive the social security and housing
benefit that they had previously enjoyed. That is estimated to have cut the
number of bogus asylum seekers by about a half.
Politically
speaking fragment (4) also expresses a legalistic ideology, sustaining
attitudes about legal immigration. The use of ingroup possessive pronoun
"our" in this context also signals fragments of a nationalist
ideology, by which membership of "us" can only be legitimate under
specific --legalistic-- conditions and procedures.
Fragment (5) shows
another familiar strategy of political discourse, namely that of Apparent
Consensus: The speaker claims that her or his opinion or policy is not just a
partisan --and hence less credible-- position but "bipartisan". This
argument is especially intended, of course, to prevent the opposition from
protesting, and thus manages the interaction of this debate. At the same time,
such a Consensus move is politically interesting because it implies that the
proposed policy is ideologically neutral (if both Conservatives and Labour
accept it). The final sentence then aims to enhance credibility with a powerful
argumentative move, namely that of efficiency: Something is good because it
works. A classical expression of a utilitarian ideology.
Whereas at one moment
bipartisan consensus is being used as a powerful argument, the next fragment
takes the usual confrontation road, and squarely attacks Labour:
(6) It is
a great worry to me and many others that the Opposition spokesman for home
affairs seems to want to scrap the legislation and return to the previous
situation. I would consider that extremely irresponsible. It would open the
floodgates again, and presumably the 200 million a year cost that was estimated
when the legislation was introduced would again become part of the charge on the
British taxpayer.
That the
Opposition "worries" Mrs. Gorman is nothing special, and part of the
political game. Therefore, if a politician signals a problem or complication,
she'll have to emphasize that it is a problem for many, as she does here -- another
well-known (Generalization) move of parliamentary semantics. The accusation to
"scrap" legislation, to return to a (working) previous situation may
be thought to be based on a professional ideology organizing attitudes about
what can and should (not) be done in politics. That is, the Opposition is not
only accused of being lax on refugees, but also to be unprofessional.
A crucial argument in
all political argumentation is of course financial, and that is why --through
the usual threatening-fluid metaphor used for the arrival of refugees
("opening the floodgates") -- she brings us the alleged costs,
combining such reference to the standard populist phrase "charge on the
British taxpayer". The accusation of irresponsibility addressed at Labour
is another fragment of the underlying norms and values that are supposed to
define the professionality of MPs, on the one hand. At the same time, accusing
Labour of financial irresponsibility (spending) is a standard tactic of the
Conservatives -- pleading for a less generous State -- in this case also for
populist reasons (it is money spent on Them and not on Us).
Conclusion
These observations on
a few fragments have shown how political discourse in general, and especially
parliamentary debates, are replete with ideological expressions at all levels.
We have found that in such debate various ideologies may be at play at the same
time, and be made relevant in different contexts.
Politically relevant,
we first find evidence of professional ideologies, controlling attitudes,
practices and discourses of MPs and what these should and should not do.
Representing the people, defending the taxpayer, being responsible with public
finances, are all part of such an attitude, and as soon as the political
opposition is seen to break these norms and values, they will be negatively
valued and hence politically accused, as we have seen above.
Secondly, we
obviously may expect the direct or indirect expression of the political
ideologies that inspire the politics and policies of the parties involved, such
as Conservative and Labour in our example. Thus, Conservatives will advocate a
less generous state, will want to reduce benefits, and so on, whereas Labour
may be less restrictive in this case (depending on whether they are in the opposition
or form the government).
Closely related to
these conservative and more liberal ideologies are the ideologies about who
belong to Us, and who do not -- ideologies of nationalism, race and ethnicity.
We have seen that much of the debate is controlled by the usual polarization,
first between Us British and Them Foreigners and especially
refugees, and secondly between genuine (good) and bogus (bad) refugees. Here
and even more in the rest of her speech, Mrs. Gorman attributes all possible
negative things (fraud, abuse of benefits, laziness, etc) to the bogus
refugees, and the overall picture is clearly a racist definition of the others.
The political
response of Labour in this case is to emphasize opinions inspired y a
humanistic ideology, to advocate human rights and in the text to elaborate on
the miserable situation and the terrible experiences of the refugees.
Again, all these
ideologies do not express themselves neatly and explicitly. Sometimes they
merely control an intonation, a lexical item or an argumentative fallacy. They
combine with other ideologies, and sometimes this leads to apparent
contradictions in the text, for instance in disclaimers that profess empathy
with the plight of the others when in the rest of the speech no such empathy is
visible.
Finally, we have
found some evidence of the more specific political expressions and
functions of ideological opinions in parliamentary debates. We have assumed
that politics generally has priority over ideology. That is, even when a
party's philosophy in principle would mean an open-door policy for immigrants,
as is the case for Labour, the forces of politics (voters!) may make
politicians much more " realistic" and often forget their principles,
especially when their governing is at stake. Moreover, especially those
ideologies will be preferentially selected that in the current political
contexts pay most dividend. Thus, if it is relevant to be humanitarian, then
we'll find that ideology, and when it is politically rather practical, then a more
utilitarian ideology may become dominant.
It is this complex
latter process of "ideological management" that detailed political
discourse analysis is able to describe in more detail.
REFERENCES
Abrams,
D., & Hogg, M. A. (1999). Social identity theory and social cognition.
Oxford: Blackwell.
Atkinson, J. M.
(1984). Our masters voices: the language and body language of politics. London:
Methuen.
Blommaert, J., &
Bulcaen, C. (Eds.). (1998). Political linguistics. Amsterdam: Benjamins.
Chilton, P. (1988).
Orwellian language and the media. London: Pluto Press.
Chilton, P. (1995).
Security metaphors. Cold war discourse from containment to common house. New
York: Lang.
Chilton, P. (Ed.)
(1985). Language and the Nuclear Arms Debate: Nukespeak Today. London and
Dover, New Hampshire: Frances Printer.
Clark, H. H. (1996).
Using Language. Cambridge, England: Cambridge University Press.
Drew, P., &
Heritage, J. (Eds.). (1992). Talk at work. Interaction in institutional
settings. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Drew, P., &
Wootton, A. J. (Eds.). (1988). Erving Goffman: Exploring the interaction order.
Boston: Northeastern University Press.
Farr, R. M., &
Moscovici, S. (Eds.). (1984). Social representations. Cambridge (Cambridgeshire
New York Paris: Cambridge University Press Editions de la Maison des Sciences
de l'Homme.
Fiske, S. T., &
Taylor, S. E. (1991). Social cognition. New York: McGraw-Hill.
Geis, M. L. (1987).
The language of politics. New York: Springer.
Geison, G. L. (Ed.).
(1983). Professions and professional ideologies in America. Chapel Hill:
University of North Carolina Press.
Johnson-Laird, P. N.
(1983). Mental models. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Van Oostendorp, H.,
& Goldman, S. R. (Eds.). (1999). The construction of mental representations
during reading. Mahwah, NJ: Erlbaum.
Sperber, D., &
Wilson, D. (1986). Relevance: Communication and cognition. Cambridge, Mass.:
Harvard University Press.
Van Dijk, T. A.
(1984). Prejudice in discourse: An analysis of ethnic prejudice in cognition
and conversation. Amsterdam Philadelphia: J. Benjamins Co..
Van Dijk, T. A.
(1987). Communicating racism: Ethnic prejudice in thought and talk. Newbury
Park, CA: Sage Publications, Inc.
Van Dijk, T. A.
(1993). Elite discourse and racism. Newbury Park, CA, USA: Sage Publications.
Van Dijk, T. A.
(1998a). Ideology: A multidisciplinary approach. London, England UK: Sage
Publications.
Van Dijk, T. A.
(1998b). What is political discourse analysis? In: Jan Blommaert & Chris
Bulcaen (Eds.), Political linguistics. (pp. 11-52). Amsterdam: Benjamins.
Van Dijk, T. A.
(1999). Context models in discourse processing. In: van Oostendorp, Herre,
& Goldman, Susan R. (Eds.), The construction of mental representations
during reading. (pp. 123-148). Mahwah, NJ, USA: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates.
Van Dijk, T. A.
(2000). Parliamentary Debates. In R. Wodak & T. A. van Dijk (Eds.), Racism
at the Top. Parliamentary Discourses on Ethnic Issues in Six European States.
(pp. 45-78). Klagenfurt, Austria: Drava Verlag.
Van Dijk, T. A.
(Ed.). (1997). Discourse studies: A multidisciplinary introduction. 2 vols.
London (England: Sage Publications.
Van Dijk, T. A.,
& Kintsch, W. (1983). Strategies of discourse comprehension. New York:
Academic Press.
Wodak, R., &
Menz, F. (Eds.). (1990). Sprache in der Politik - Politik in der Sprache.
Analysen zum "ffentlichen Sprachgebrauch. (Language in politics - politics
in language. Analyses of public language use). Klagenfurt: Drava.
Wodak, R., & Van
Dijk, T. A. (Eds.). Racism at the Top. Parliamentary Discourses on Ethnic
Issues in Six European States. Klagenfurt, Austria: Drava Verlag.
(Please refer to the orginal website for
more . 请查阅原网站获得更多信息。此页面仅作推荐。页内连接为原网站连接)
来源:http://www.discourse-in-society.org
2003年7月4日17:46