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11

The Partial Nature of Metaphorical Structuring

  Up to this point we have described the systematic character of metaphorically defined concepts. Such concepts are understood in terms of a number of different metaphors(e.g., TIME IS MONEY, TIME IS A MOVING OBJECT, etc.). The metaphorical structuring of concepts is necessarily partial and is reflected in the lexicon of the language, including the phrasal lexicon, which contains fixed-form expressions such as "to be without foundation." Because concepts are metaphorically structured in a systematic way, e.g., theories are buildings, it is possible for us to use ex­pressions (construct, foundation) from one domain (build­ings) to talk about corresponding concepts in the metaphorically defined domain (theories). What foundation, for example, means in the metaphorically defined do­main (theory) will depend on the details of how the metaphorical concept theories are buildings is used to structure the concept theory.

The parts of the concept building that are used to structure the concept theory are the foundation and the outer shell The roof, internal rooms, staircases, and hall­ways are parts of a building not used as part of the concept theory. Thus the metaphor theories are buildings has a "used" part (foundation and outer shell) and an "un­used" part (rooms, staircases, etc.). Expressions such as construct and foundation are instances of the used part of such a metaphorical concept and are part of our ordinary literal language about theories.

But what of the linguistic expressions that reflect the

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"unused" part of a metaphor like theories are build­ings? Here are four examples:

 His theory has thousands of little rooms and long, winding corridors.

 His theories are Bauhaus in their pseudofunctional simplicity.

 He prefers massive Gothic theories covered with gargoyles.

 Complex theories usually have problems with the plumbing.

These sentences fall outside the domain of normal literal language and are part of what is usually called "figurative" or "imaginative" language. Thus, literal expressions ("He has constructed a theory") and imaginative expressions ("His theory is covered with gargoyles") can be instances of the same general metaphor (theories are buildings).

Here we can distinguish three different subspecies of imaginative (or nonliteral) metaphor:

Extensions of the used part of a metaphor, e.g., "These facts are the bricks and mortar of my theory." Here the outer shell of the building is referred to, whereas the theories are build­ings metaphor stops short of mentioning the materials used.

Instances of the unused part of the literal metaphor, e.g., "His theory has thousands of little rooms and long, winding cor­ridors."

Instances of novel metaphor, that is, a metaphor not used to structure part of our normal conceptual system but as a new way of thinking about something, e.g., "Classical theories are patriarchs who father many children, most of whom fight in­cessantly." Each of these subspecies lies outside the used part of a metaphorical concept that structures our normal con­ceptual system.

We note in passing that all of the linguistic expressions we have given to characterize general metaphorical con­cepts are figurative. Examples are time is money, time is A MOVING OBJECT, CONTROL IS UP, IDEAS ARE FOOD, theories are buildings, etc. None of these is literal. This

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is a consequence of the fact that only part of them is used to structure our normal concepts. Since they necessarily con­tain parts that are not used in our normal concepts, they go beyond the realm of the literal.

Each of the metaphorical expressions we have talked about so far (e.g., the time will come; we construct a theory, attack an idea) is used within a whole system of metaphorical concepts---concepts that we constantly use in living and thinking. These expressions, like all other words and phrasal lexical items in the language, are fixed by con­vention. In addition to these cases, which are parts of whole metaphorical systems, there are idiosyncratic metaphorical expressions that stand alone and are not used systemat­ically in our language or thought. These are well-known expressions like the foot of the mountain, a head of cab­bage, the leg of a table, etc. These expressions are isolated instances of metaphorical concepts, where there is only one instance of a used part (or maybe two or three). Thus the foot of the mountain is the only used part of the metaphor a mountain is a person. In normal discourse we do not speak of the head, shoulders, or trunk of a mountain, though in special contexts it is possible to construct novel metaphorical expressions based on these unused parts. In fact, there is an aspect of the metaphor a mountain is a person in which mountain climbers will speak of the shoul­der of a mountain (namely, a ridge near the top) and of conquering, fighting, and even being killed by a mountain. And there are cartoon conventions where mountains be­come animate and their peaks become heads. The point here is that there are metaphors, like a mountain is a person, that are marginal in our culture and our language; their used part may consist of only one conventionally fixed expression of the language, and they do not systematically interact with other metaphorical concepts because so little of them is used. This makes them relatively uninteresting for our purposes but not completely so, since they can be extended to their unused part in coining novel metaphorical

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expressions, making jokes, etc. And our ability to extend them to unused parts indicates that, however marginal they are, they do exist.

    Examples like the foot of the mountain are idiosyncratic, unsystematic, and isolated. They do not interact with other metaphors, play no particularly interesting role in our con­ceptual system, and hence are not metaphors that we live by. The only signs of life they have is that they can be extended in subcultures and that their unused portions serve as the basis for (relatively uninteresting) novel metaphors. If any metaphorical expressions deserve to be called "dead," it is these, though they do have a bare spark of life, in that they are understood partly in terms of mar­ginal metaphorical concepts like a mountain is a person.

It is important to distinguish these isolated and un­systematic cases from the systematic metaphorical expres­sions we have been discussing. Expressions like wasting time, attacking positions, going our separate ways, etc., are reflections of systematic metaphorical concepts that structure our actions and thoughts. They are "alive" in the most fundamental sense: they are metaphors we live by. The fact that they are conventionally fixed within the lexi­con of English makes them no less alive.